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 The distribution utility is left with an increased power over issues of access to electricity.
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In the early 2000s, the Philippine government reformed its electricity sector following neoliberal prin-
ciples: unbundling of the power industry, privatisation of assets and commodiﬁcation of electricity. This
paper shows that the reform was primarily driven by the need to secure electricity supply and cut down
tariffs. These national objectives ousted other issues, and notably those that ﬁnd their expression at the
urban level, among which the question of access to electricity in Metro Manila's urban poor commu-
nities. The central state withdrew its attention from the issue of electriﬁcation, and local actors had to
react as they were confronted to social tensions and practices of pilferage. As a consequence, city
governments and local administrations are getting involved in this issue, which opens the way to
participation of civil society. This paper shows how the “rolling back” of the central state led to new
partnerships and arrangements between the distribution utility, local governments and community
organisations. This movement points to an urbanisation of energy issues, which could bring positive
results for end-users provided that it is accompanied by a clearer regulatory framework.
& 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In the aftermath of the power crisis that occurred in the Phi-
lippines at the end of the 1980s and through most of the 1990s, a
reform of the sector's industry was draughted in the hope to shelter
the country against the shortage of electricity supply it had been
experiencing. This choice of a new model of regulation has placed
the Philippines at the centre of the heated debate between the
advocates of the so-called “neoliberal” model of regulation, andOT, Build–Operate–Transfer;
E, Department of Energy; DU,
ERC, Energy Regulatory
Local Government Unit;
; NASECORE, National Asso-
tional Power Company; NCR,
ganisation; Transco, National
ity Spot Marketthose who insist on the irreplaceable social function of state-owned
actors in this critical industry (McDonald, 2009). The justiﬁcation of
our use of the term “neoliberal” in order to characterise the Phi-
lippine reform is twofold. First, the reform was encouraged by
actors that have long been associated with this school of thought,
notably the World Bank (Bayliss et al., 2011) and the Asian Devel-
opment Bank (ADB), through advisory work and loan
requirements.1 Second, the content of the reform is in line with1 The well-known World Bank (1993) paper The World Bank's role in the electric
power sector: policies for effective institutional, regulatory, and ﬁnancial reform re-
ceived a lot of attention from Philippine policymakers. Beyond their mere inﬂu-
ence, these two institutions had a more direct involvement in the reform with two
loans that set precise requirements: a 1984 WB loan of USD 300 million required
the adoption of laws on privatisation (that came to be Presidential Decrees 2029
and 2030), and a 1998 ADB loan (supported by the WB and the IMF) of another USD
300 million targeted more speciﬁcally the electricity sector. The second part of it
was not made available before the EPIRA was adopted (Bello, 2005).
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electricity reform.2
There were two main concerns at the time of the reform: se-
curity of supply and tariffs. As a consequence, a lot of issues were
left aside by the EPIRA, and notably problems that arise in urban
poor communities such as electriﬁcation, electricity theft, or the
politicisation of tariffs. While the urban poor3 living in low-income
and often untitled areas constitute a signiﬁcant proportion of
Metro Manila's inhabitants – it is estimated that one in ten in-
habitants lives in an informal settlement in the National Capital
Region (NCR) (Porio, 2002, 2012) – they were overlooked by a
legislation that hardly took notice of their situation. Such lack of
attention has been observed before in a number of studies focus-
ing on the outcome of neoliberal reforms for the urban poor
(Baron and Peyroux, 2011). Soon after the implementation of these
new schemes, the social dimension of service provision was re-
discovered as public authorities had to face the social tensions
produced by inadequate access to utilities, as well as the risk of
tampering, theft and disconnections destabilising the network. It
put into question the relevance of neoliberal reforms when tack-
ling poverty. The World Bank itself called for a more cautious
handling of reforms, stating that not all national contexts could
beneﬁt equally from privatisation and that strong regulatory me-
chanisms were required if access to services for all was to be
achieved (World Bank, 2004). While important studies have been
made in the case of water distribution (Sansom, 2006; Baruah,
2007), the electricity sector has yet to be investigated more closely,
even if access to energy has been recognised as a key element for
the development of urban poor communities (Tully, 2006). The
precociousness of the reform make it an interesting case study in
order to observe its long-term effects on electricity distribution. In
addition, contrary to a majority of developing countries that have
been undertaking reforms but adapting and implementing them in
their own way, creating “hybrid” models (Eberhard, 2007; Grat-
wick and Eberhard, 2008), the Philippines have followed closely
the guidelines provided by international institutions. This paper
therefore aims at fuelling this debate by providing an assessment
of electriﬁcation in the context of low-income areas of the Phi-
lippine national capital region.
So far, previous studies on the consequences of service priva-
tisation and liberalisation in other national contexts have under-
lined two major consequences (Jaglin, 2007). First, one can observe
a rescaling towards more local projects and schemes, with urban
poor communities that emerge as spaces of bricolage and inven-
tion. Second, there is an increasing fragmentation between low-
income districts when it comes to access to electricity, depending
on the potential, social capital and capacity to mobilise of the
population. The ﬁndings presented in this paper are consistent
with these observations. The strong demand for service delivery in
low-income districts used to be addressed by governmental pro-
grams, and was left unanswered when the central state stepped
down from this issue in the aftermath of the reform. As a con-
sequence, Meralco, the distribution utility, had to adapt and2 Victor and Heller identify 4 core elements in the reform: ‘unbundling’, pri-
vatisation, creation of regulatory institutions (independent regulators that oversee
competition and regulate the monopoly-prone segments of the sector) and creation
of market (allow the market to work in the segments where competition can be
introduced).
3 The term “urban poor” will be used in this paper in a broader meaning than
the ofﬁcial Philippine deﬁnition. The National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB)
estimates that only 2.6% of the population in the NCR lives in poverty (to be
compared with 18.9% at the national level). However, this ﬁgure does not grasp the
full socioeconomic reality of the Philippine capital city, since it only takes into
account extreme poverty: families leaving with less than PHP 20,344 per year, or
US$38 per month (US$1¼PHP 44.709000, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 28/04/2014)
for the whole family.change its repertory of action by relying on new, urban actors.
Local governments empowered by the politico-administrative
decentralisation emerged as important stakeholders and started to
take action. As a consequence, Local Governments Units (LGUs) at
the level of cities and municipalities, as well as barangay halls4 at
the level of districts, became involved in electriﬁcation schemes.
The present paper highlights the partnerships that these local
public actors form with organisations from civil society. In doing
so, it adds up to a rich literature on state-community and utility-
community collaborations, beyond the example of Metro Manila
(Heller, 2001; Krishna, 2003). These localised institutional ar-
rangements raise questions regarding the governance of the
electricity sector, fuelling interrogations regarding an “urbanisa-
tion” of energy issues (Jaglin and Verdeil, 2013; Jaglin, 2014).2. Methodology
This work is based upon ﬁeld work of 5 months in Metro
Manila, during the spring semester of 2013. It ﬁrst aimed at in-
vestigating the reform in itself using the tools of public policy
analysis, looking at how it had been designed and implemented,
and studying its intended outcomes on urban poverty. In order to
carry out this analysis, interviews were organised with key DoE
and ERC ofﬁcials, with Meralco executives and with stakeholders
from civil society, notably the National Association of Electricity
Consumers for Reforms (NASECORE). The archives of Meralco were
also consulted.
The second level of analysis involved taking a closer look at
electricity issues at the local level, focusing on how they were
expressed and dealt with. In order to look at the implementation
of electriﬁcation programs in urban poor communities, two areas
were selected in Quezon City: barangay Payatas and barangay
Pansol. Payatas is one of the major dumpsites of Metro Manila, and
is home to one of the largest informal settlements in the me-
tropolitan area, with an estimated 117,000 inhabitants in 2007
(Porio, 2008). While some areas of Payatas have beneﬁtted from
regularisation programs, it is still largely composed of untitled
popular housing. The status of the land is mixed, with both public
and private land. Pansol, on the other hand, is an example of a
smaller community sheltering 725 families that was regularised in
1987, when the National Housing Authority (NHA) bought the land
in order to redistribute it to its inhabitants in the form of in-
dividual lots. Most of the population is therefore eligible for re-
ceiving a proper electricity connection from the DU. Re-
presentatives from the administrations of these two urban poor
communities were interviewed, and input was also collected from
a handful of residents in order to corroborate the ﬁrst ﬁndings.3. In search of a national security of supply: the evolution of
the Philippine electricity sector
EPIRA's draughting was carried out in a particular context: that
of a past decade, the 1990s, characterised by electricity shortages.
It is of paramount importance to have this element in mind in
order to understand the choices made by decision-makers. This
part will therefore explore the challenges related to the security of
electricity provision. The second part of this section will retrace
the history of the decisions taken in order to address the problem
of blackouts, which eventually led to the restructuring of the
electricity sector.4 The barangay is the smallest politico-administrative unit in the Philippines.
6 Bello (2005, p. 168).
7 The two largest regions of the country, if one excludes the island of Mind-
anao, where political unrest largely prevents the implementation of public policies
designed by the Philippine Government.
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sector
One of the main problems with electricity provision in emerging
countries lies in demographics: the rapid increase of the population,
notably in South-East Asia, exerts a real pressure on infrastructure and
utilities in general, and electricity provision in particular (World Bank,
2005, 2010). This observation is very true in the case of the Philippines
where the growth rate was as high as 3.54% in the period 1950–1955.
Consequently its population quadrupled between the years 1950 and
2000, and is now reachingmore than 90million inhabitants. Given the
demographic trends at work, one understands how the electricity
sector failed to catch up with demand, and how blackouts became
more and more frequent during the 1980s and the beginning of the
1990s. The consequences for the economy were acute. These episodes
of brownout could last for up to 10 h every day, and were the direct
consequence of a lack of power supply: the demand excessed the
system's capacity by 48% in 1992. Industrial areas suffered from
blackouts, while shopping malls were asked to shorten their opening
time by two hours. The economic cost of this failure to meet demand
was estimated at US $1.6 billion – or 1.5% of the GDP – for the year
1992 alone (Henisz and Zelner, 2001). One has to bear in mind an
element of context to appreciate the seriousness of the situation: the
country was seeking to achieve high economic development and at-
tract foreign investors. In the quest for Foreign Direct Investments
(FDIs), this inability to provide businesses with a stable and reliable
source of electricity sent a bad signal to investors.
In order to cope with this problem, ofﬁcials took measures to
improve the generation capacity of the electricity sector through
the fast-tracking of several power plant projects. The urgency of
the situation made it necessary to make huge investments. Un-
fortunately the Philippines lacked the ﬁnancial capacity to fulﬁll
that on a large scale. From 1993 to 1995, the government turned
more openly to the private sector and thus initiated a tendency
that would lead to the EPIRA a few years later. In order to facilitate
the private ownership of power plants, a legal framework had
already been adopted in 1990 with the “Build–Operate–Transfer”
law, which was amended in 1994. This recourse to the private
sector was quite successful, if one considers that between 1992
and 1998 – the end of the crisis – the country's generation capacity
increased by 5000 MW: a 70% increase in these 5 years (Sharmaa
et al., 2004). It is clear that this power crisis durably affected the
perception of the electricity sector by the elites: the public utility
was considered inefﬁcient while private companies were depicted
as the country's rescuers.
3.2. The era of privatisation
The crisis put the reform of the sector on top of the decision-ma-
kers' agenda: it created a window of opportunity. By 1994, the Phi-
lippines had more than 40 contracts with Independent Power Pro-
ducers (IPPs): more than the rest of the developing world as a whole
(Woodhouse, 2005). While this issue was put on the agenda, policy-
makers already had a solution in mind: the idea prevailed that the
sector needed not only to be reformed, but also to be privatised. The
DoE indeed discarded the idea of a reform without privatising the
industry: “… it will not raise private capital and cash…NPCwould still
be dependent on the government… there will still be subsidies, dis-
tortions and political interferences… we still have to deal with gov-
ernment bureaucracy…one government entity will be selling to an-
other government entity”.5 In this sense, the power crisis was de-
terminant for the sector's reform. It revealed the need for a change in
the industry, and set the terms of the debate for future policies.5 DoE (2001), quoted in Sharmaa et al. (2004), p. 7.The electricity reform is embedded in a movement of privati-
sation of state assets initiated by President Ramos (1992–1998).
This massive privatisation of state assets comprises notably: the
Philippine Airlines (1992), the Oriental Petroleum and Mining
Company, the Paper Industry Corporation of the Philippines, the
Philippine National Bank, the National Steel Corporation (1994) as
well as most telecommunication facilities (1995). The municipal
water distribution utility covering Metro Manila, the MWSS, was
also privatised in 1997. To use the words of the former President,
there was a will to develop a “new paradigm of governance”. The
idea that state-owned enterprises (SOCs) were poorly managed
and suffered from negative political inﬂuences was very present in
the Philippines. Indeed, several privatisation processes shed light
to this malfunctioning of SOCs, with the notable example of water
distribution for instance. The public MWSS offered rates of PHP
8.78 per cubic metre prior to its privatisation, and the two winning
concessionaires, Maynilad and Manila Water, offered respectively
PHP 4.98 and PHP 2.32. This experience convinced the public
opinion of the beneﬁts of privatisation, and comforted the gov-
ernment in its position. Another element that explains this mas-
sive recourse to privatisation is exogenous, and lies in the global
discourse that, at that time, encouraged such practices. The
Philippine Government was indeed in close contact with the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The ﬁnancial
pressure was quite important for the Philippines at that time: if
one takes the year 1998, the deﬁcit for the Government amounted
to PHP 40 billion, while the deﬁcit for the entire public sector was
PHP 73.7 billion.6
3.3. Implementation and assessment of the EPIRA
What is designated in this paper as the “electricity reform” refers to
a series of legislative actions that aimed towards a common goal: the
privatisation of the electricity industry, and the liberalisation of this
sector in order to foster competition. The movement was initiated
with the introduction of IPPs following the BOT law in 1990, and
reached its conclusionwith Republic Act No. 9136 – the EPIRA of 2001.
This reform provided for the unbundling of the electricity industry, in
order to allow for the privatisation of the sector. The generation seg-
ment had a mixed status before the EPIRA, with both privately run
producers and NPC. The public company's assets were sold to private
investors. The transmission segment is by nature different, since no
competition can be introduced. The NAPOCOR division in charge of
this activity became a distinct company, TransCo, which was privatised
in 2003 through a concession agreement. The distribution segment
was less impacted by the reforms, since Meralco was already a private
entity.
The last stages of the EPIRA implementation will soon be
completed: the privatisation of NPC is well-advanced (to this day,
the generation assets of Luzon and the Visayas7 are now composed
of 86.5% of privately run plants and most of the remaining state-
owned plants are scheduled for privatisation in the coming year8),
and slowly large consumers are beginning to use the WESM. As a
consequence, the stakeholders have started making a ﬁrst general
assessment of the reform's impact. And in this regard, the EPIRA is
being widely criticised in the country. The Philippines is known as
the ASEAN country that has the highest electricity rates (Joint
Foreign Chambers of the Philippines, 2010).9 Not only have the8 DoE (2013), slide 22.
9 The report shows that in 2010, the average rate for residential consumers in
the Philippines amounted to 18USc/KWh (p. 122). However, note that this ranking
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the transparency of competition in the electricity market: the
Philippine Supreme Court has frozen an important rate increase
from Meralco, as the DU is being investigated on alleged practices
of collusion with power producers leading to artiﬁcially high
power prices on the WESM (Business World, 20/01/2014; Rappler,
22/01/2014). Beyond the question of price, security of supply is
also being questioned, especially if one considers the demand that
is bound to increase, with the notable rise of a middle-class that
distinguishes itself with new patterns of consumption, and for
instance the use of air-conditioning systems (Sahakian, 2011). The
country's generation capacity is still very dependent on traditional
sources of energy. As of 2012, the Philippine generation capacity
relies on coal (30%), hydro (22%), oil (18%), natural gas (18%) and
geothermal (11%), solar and biomass representing less than 0.7%
altogether (DoE, 2013). While it has been shown that the Phi-
lippines have a lot of potential when it comes to the development
of solar and wind energy, the current regulatory framework has
failed, so far, to attract signiﬁcant private investment on renewable
energies (Bakhtyar et al., 2013).4. Urban electricity provision and poverty: the blind spot of
the reforms
Following the end of Martial Law and its repressive stance to-
wards informal settlers in 1986, quite a lot of public attention was
directed towards poverty alleviation and universal access to basic
services (Shatkin, 2004). The government launched programs
promoting electriﬁcation, one of which will be discussed in this
section. Meralco estimated in 1985 that the electriﬁcation rate in
depressed areas was under 25% (Kikuchi, 1999),10 but by the end of
the main electriﬁcation programme nearly all households had a
connection. However the 1990s saw a change in the agenda of
policymakers, and gradually the debate came to revolve ex-
clusively around the questions of tariff and reliability of electricity
provision. The electriﬁcation rate decreased in low-income areas,
and an estimated 30% of the programme beneﬁciaries ended-up
being disconnected because of back payments (Interview F).
4.1. Electriﬁcation for the urban poor: the rolling back of the central
state
The Philippine State used to play a role in the promotion of
access to electricity, in the more remote rural areas (it is a real
issue in the Philippines, where the population is scattered in over
2000 islands) as well as in the urban centres where it was not
technical but ﬁnancial obstacles that posed problems. Important
programs were carried out in the 1990s under the leadership of
the Government, which managed to ﬁnd the funding necessary for
such an endeavour, and also contributed to the design and im-
plementation of the programme through its various agencies and
commissions.
The biggest of electriﬁcation programs was the Depressed Areas
Electriﬁcation Programme (DAEP)11: it was notable for two reasons.
The ﬁrst one was its scale: it targeted 229 “areas for priority de-
velopment”, regrouping 320,000 households (exceeding the initial
objective of 300,000 households) or about 2 million inhabitants.(footnote continued)
can be questioned since it does not take into account the high level of subsidies
present in other countries (Indonesia, Cambodia for instance).
10 In the Meralco franchise, the same report notes that the electriﬁcation rate
was 92.9% at the time (p. 550).
11 “Depressed areas” is the terminology used by the Philippine administration
in order to designate informal settlements.The second one was that it exempliﬁed the shift in the dogma
regarding popular settlements: the idea here was to provide
electricity even in settlements that were located on contested land
– be it public or private. It was the result of a series of meetings
gathering the Meralco, the Presidential Commission on the Urban
Poor (PCUP), the NHA as well as the Housing and Urban Devel-
opment Coordinating Council (HUDCC), which started in 1989
(USAID, 2004). This programme was made possible by the Japanese
Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), which provided the ne-
cessary funds in the form of a 5066 million yen loan (USD 36.7
million).12 The remaining 20% of the total cost were borne by
Meralco. The DAEP ended in 1999, when the funds were all de-
pleted. Its results were largely evaluated as positive, even if part of
the beneﬁciary households later had to face disconnection because
of their inability to pay the bills on time (Kikuchi, 1999; USAID,
2004).
Since the beginning of the 2000s, one can observe that the
state has had a diminished role in the issue of access to electricity
in popular settlements. The most important change is perhaps that
now the central state does not initiate electriﬁcation programs.
With the reform and the adoption of the principle of recourse to
the private sector, these previous forms of public intervention
have disappeared without any real alternative programs taking
their place.
4.2. Tariffs and the poor
The question of access to electricity for the poorer is addressed
through one policy instrument only: the creation of a subsidised
tariff (see Table 1). All consumers, residential, commercial or in-
dustrial, ﬁnance it collectively, but it is limited to residential
beneﬁciaries. This subsidy is consumption-based, and does not
depend on the revenues of the household. While it targets “mar-
ginalised/low-income captive market end-users who cannot afford
to pay at full cost”,13 it only takes into consideration the level of
consumption of the household. This focus on the level of con-
sumption is based on the premise that poorer households own less
electric appliances, and therefore have a lower consumption of
electricity. While this assumption is not false, this system suffers
from serious shortcomings. First of all, this subsidy does not, as the
law states it, target exclusively the “marginalised end-users”.
Wealthy households, for instance, have secondary residences that
they seldom use, and which often beneﬁt from lifeline rates. On
the contrary, in some cases poorer households have a consumption
that is above the limit of the lifeline. An executive from the dis-
tribution utility (Interview F) indeed acknowledged this phe-
nomenon, which he explained by advancing two possibilities. First
of all, the size of their household is not taken into account, and
therefore a family with ten members living under the same roof
will consume more than a couple with no children. Second, the
appliances owned by low-income earning families tend to be
older, and can be less energy-efﬁcient.
Apart from this redistribution mechanism, the social dimension
of electricity distribution seems to be receiving very little attention
from public authorities. The current regulatory framework in the
Philippines states that the general policy is to be draughted by
the Department of Energy (DoE). However the various ofﬁcials from
the Department that could be interviewed were not familiar with
the question of electriﬁcation for the urban poor. It is striking that
when Meralco launches an electriﬁcation programme in an urban
poor community, it is not recognised as such by the DoE. The12 Calculated based on the average Yen/USD exchange rate for the year 1989
(¥/US$¼¥138).
13 Electricity Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (Republic Act No. 9136), Rule
4 (yy).
Table 1
The lifeline subsidy scheme in the Meralco fran-
chise area.
kWh Consumption Lifeline discount (% of charge)
1–20 100
21–50 50
51–70 35
71–100 20
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but it is not underlined or ﬁled in a separate category from other
extensions of the network: the public administration simply has
no legibility over the electriﬁcation of depressed areas. While this
issue would fall under the prerogative of the DoE, it is not con-
sidered as an issue, and it is looked over. The political vacuum
created by the reform and the withdrawal of the central state from
these issues has created a need for new arrangements, which in-
volve a number of new urban actors.14 UDHA of 1992, article V, section 21 (b) and article VI (d).5. Emerging partnerships to tackle electricity issues in low-
income settlements
As the reform has left a political vacuum for urban actors to ﬁll,
this section looks at the new arrangements that have emerged in
order to tackle the tensions created by the lack of access to elec-
tricity and a high incidence of pilferage.
5.1. A repositioning of actors at the urban scale after the reform
This re-emergence of urban electricity issues has an impact on
the DU's behaviour, and is triggering a change in its internal po-
licies and marketing strategies. It is visible in the domains of
electriﬁcation and electricity pilferage. Although Meralco has been
signiﬁcantly empowered by the reform, it cannot develop its po-
licies and projects alone and has to rely on new local partnerships.
This tendency of relying on additional partners outside of state
institutions is not unique to the Philippines, and has been docu-
mented in the case of other urban services (Baud et al., 2004;
Sansom, 2006; Baruah, 2007). It is in line with the neoliberal
framework, which promotes a reorganisation of civil society and
the mobilisation of local communities in order to go along with
market mechanisms (Jessop, 2002; Baron and Peyroux, 2011). In
the present case study, it points to a downscaling of electricity
issues, similar to what Jaglin and Verdeil (2013) have termed an
"urbanisation" of the energy question. It translates into a mount-
ing integration of energy issues within the agenda of urban actors,
while in turn the traditional stakeholders of the sector are in-
creasingly inﬂuenced by the way these new actors frame the
problems and mobilise solutions.
5.1.1. Meralco: a strengthened utility that has to connect with other
urban actors
When it comes to electriﬁcation, the DU has a signiﬁcant room
of manoeuvre. Indeed, the state has place few constraints on
Meralco. The EPIRA and its further development, the Magna Carta
for residential consumers (2004) produced by the ERC, both
mention the question of popular settlements. Article 6 of the
EPIRA effectively excludes residents without security of tenure
from electricity provision. The text offers a legal basis to Meralco
for refusing applications in urban poor communities. This rule was
the result of a lobbying from Meralco: the actors present at the
time when the EPIRA was designed and passed mentioned that
strict requirements (several documents testifying ownership of the
occupied land have to be produced) were wanted by the DU(Interviews C and D). This was a way for the company to “protect
itself” and “not take sides in land conﬂicts” (Interview E).
The consequence of this rule is to position Meralco as the prime
decision-maker when it comes to informal settlements, and this em-
powerment of the company is visible in the evolution of how elec-
triﬁcation programs are carried out. Indeed, while they are carried out
with the intervention of both the DU and the relevant LGUs, Meralco is
the entity that takes the decision to do something in the ﬁrst place.
Beyond the mere problem of electriﬁcation, the DU also has certain
autonomy when it comes to setting standards of service. The example
of the visibility of the wires (whether they are hanging atop the streets
or buried underground) is quite telling. The legislation hardly men-
tions the subject, and Meralco has been able to establish the following
standard of service as jurisprudence: by default, wires are hanging
atop the streets, unless an LGU or a private developer is willing to pay
for the extra cost involved in infrastructure burial (Interview G). In this
context, there is no incentive for Meralco to increase its expenditure
for its wires. And the situation is translated by the variability of
standards on the matter. In middle and low income areas, Meralco's
installations, and in particular its wires, are very visible (see Picture 1).
On the contrary, other areas are beneﬁtting from better infra-
structure, with wires that are placed higher and more orderly, and
that do not constitute a potential hazard (see Picture 2, taken from
a district neighbouring Pansol).
However other actors are also taking a stance on energy issues,
and Meralco has to collaborate with them, either because they
raise awareness and lobby for a shift in its action, or because the
utility can form partnerships and share resources with them.
5.1.2. The increased role of city governments and barangays
While the electricity sector was undergoing a profound re-
structuring, another process was taking place in the Philippines:
decentralisation. With the adoption of the Local Government Code
in 1991, consolidated in 1992 by the Urban Development and
Housing Act (UDHA), the Philippines witnessed the rise of LGUs.
These “government units” are present on two levels. In Metro
Manila, there are 17 administrative cities, each composed of sev-
eral districts – barangays – that have their own administration. It is
argued here that the two processes have produced a phenomenon
of “downscaling” of energy issues. However, rather than being the
result of a push from local authorities willing to take action and
carry out an agenda of their own, this movement was triggered by
the withdrawal of the Government. The emergence, in the deci-
sion-making process, of these lower strata of the administration
was the result of the stepping down of the state at the national
level. What is particularly interesting and innovative is that this
phenomenon opens the door for a more important role of actors
from the civil society.
The Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA) of 1992 gives
city government the responsibility to provide “power and elec-
tricity and an adequate power distribution system” in resettlement
areas, socialised housing, slum improvement sites and “areas for
priority development”.14 In addition, the DU is required by the
Philippine Distribution Code to consult and get input from them.
The choice of the beneﬁciary area for an electriﬁcation programme
as well as its proceedings is therefore the result of a discussion
between Meralco and the city government. However this stepping
up of LGUs in the energy landscape has to be nuanced. While the
legislation has put them in charge of electricity provision, it has
left them no coercive means of action. And, asymmetry of in-
formation clearly favours the DU when LGUs enter into negotia-
tion with city governments. It is also notable that city governments
do not have a department dedicated to issues regarding power
Picture 1. The wires hanging over Pansol in Quezon City, Metro Manila, February
2013.
Picture 2. Loyola Grand Villas, Quezon City, Metro Manila, April 2014.
15 On the role of civil society and the increasing participation of NGOs at the
local level, see Shatkin (2000, 2007).
16 Gawad Kalinga – the Gawad Kalinga Community Development Foundation –
was formed in 2003. It is a well-known NGO in the country, whose objectives are
the following: ‘ending poverty for 5 million families by 2024; land for the landless;
homes for the homeless; food for the hungry’ (http://www.gk1world.com).
17 Gloria Macapagal was President of the Philippines (2001–2010) at the time
of EPIRA's enactment.
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the design of electriﬁcation programs, but overall, city govern-
ments have no trained personnel in order to deal speciﬁcally with
energy issues. They have yet to assert themselves in order to go
beyond their role of mere advisor to Meralco. Indeed, while elec-
triﬁcation programs are carried out with the intervention of both
the DU and the concerned LGUs, it is notable that Meralco is ul-
timately the entity that makes the decision. Executives of the DU
involved in these electriﬁcation programs reveal that the company
chooses the areas that will beneﬁt from their action depending on
the relationship that they have with city governments: “We work
with the city governments that are willing to work with us, that
are efﬁcient” (Interview E).
The other administrative level empowered by the UDHA is the
barangay, even if it is not speciﬁcally in charge of electricity issues.
While these actors are usually not present during the talks be-
tween the city government and the DU – and in any case they have
no direct power of decision in this matter – they remain im-
portant. Indeed, as the level of governance closest to the in-
habitants, they are usually involved in the implementation phase
of electriﬁcation projects. They stand between the DU and the
beneﬁciaries, and are therefore key elements in the communica-
tion between these two parties. While they hold no power in the
decision to electrify or not the area they are in charge of, their
cooperation is usually a great asset for the success of a given
project. On the contrary, their lack of cooperation can greatlyimpede the development of such an endeavour. Therefore, while
Barangay halls are not directly in charge of electricity provision by
law, this issue is still present at this level of governance. For
instance, it is notable that the question of electriﬁcation is an
important issue in campaigns for the election of the barangay
representatives (Interview B). It is also through the barangay
administrations that organisations from civil society, NGOs and
CBOs, manage to express themselves. These actors participate in
the public life at the local level – and this participation is provi-
sioned by law15 – and therefore discuss electricity matters with
barangay ofﬁcials, who will in turn communicate their inputs to
the city level (Interviews A, B and I). The DU is now forming re-
lationships directly with actors from the civil society – NGOs
mainly – and in a way bypasses the state institutions. Among other
advantages that such a partnership can have for Meralco is the
possibility to use the NGO's resources in order to ﬁnance the cost
of the wires linking the clusters of metres to the newly electriﬁed
households. NGOs also have capacities to mobilise the community,
which can be interesting for the DU. The most advertised of such
partnerships so far is with the NGO Gawad Kalinga.16
5.2. Meralco's struggle against pilferage: from repression to more
diverse strategies
The fact that Meralco has a certain autonomy has led to a di-
versiﬁcation of its action in low-income areas. Between a purely
repressive approach focused on ﬁghting illegal tapping, and a
more inclusive one that aims at integrating the urban poor into the
formal system, the DU has developed several strategies. The
company is indeed left relatively free to make its own choices
relatively to urban poor communities when households are not
able to present a land title. The question is then: why is the utility
concerned at all with this category of population? Until very re-
cently, the company did not communicate much on its role as a
service provider for the urban poor: it was for instance a ﬁerce
opponent to the introduction of lifeline rates when the EPIRA was
being designed, and it tried to appeal the decision to renew the
subsidised rates for another ten years in 2012. Some of Meralco's
executives perceive the measure as “unfair”, since it favours the
most difﬁcult customers – those who do not pay in time, who steal
electricity – over the “good” customers who do not create any
problems:
“Meralco was willing to remove the lifeline rate provision, be-
cause it is not fair to other consumers. When it was renewed
for another ten years, we were not happy about that. The de-
cision was very political, it was adopted during the time of
Gloria Macapagal,17 when she needed to win the voices of the
masses – and at that time the clamour was for lower electricity
rates”(Interview H).
What triggered its action, however, was being confronted to the
high incidence of electricity pilferage. It is all the more important
for the DU that the ERC sets a limit to the “acceptable” losses of
electricity-both technical and non-technical. The cost of losses will
fall upon the DU once this limit is reached (Fig. 1). If losses are
below this level, the amount of money saved is used to reduce
tariffs. Figure 1 shows the evolution of these losses overtime.
Fig. 1. The Evolution of electricity losses in the Meralco franchise.
Source: Meralco Presentation “How do you light up a nation?”, Meeting with the German Club, 22/11/2011.
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adopted several approaches. First, resources are dedicated to ﬁghting
electricity theft and tampering, with employees that are sent to af-
fected areas in order to cut illegal connections and prosecute violators
in front of ERC judges (Interviews D and F). In some areas controls by
Meralco are as frequent as once a week. Usually, the wires are cut
during the day, and the following night tappers re-establish the lines
(Interview B). This game of cats-and-mice is very time-consuming for
both the utility and the illegal tappers, which has led the company to
try alternative modes of action.
Second, in recent years, Meralco has been trying to cast a more
positive image of its role, and appear as a socially responsible or-
ganisation rather than a mere proﬁt-seeking company. A good
example of this is the installation of street-lighting, whose cost is
divided between the LGU and the utility. This initiative shows the
company's will to emphasise its social role, but also its effort to
reduce electricity theft. Indeed, the lights are equipped with
alarms that detect electricity tampering, and shut off electricity for
the whole community when activated. In this case, the idea is to
“make consumers face they responsibilities when they do not pay
their bills” and “let them pay the price of living with no electricity
service” (Interview I). Meralco's strategy is to “educate” the urban
poor and install a system of incentives in order to reduce metre
tampering and electricity pilferage.
Third, in order to offer the urban poor a more affordable ser-
vice, and integrate them to the legal system of distribution, a new
offer is being developed and tested by Meralco: pre-paid metering.
The development of this system is still at its beginning: a pilot area
has been designated and the scheme is being experimented, but
the company is still working on the technical possibilities. The
scheme has been approved by the ERC, but no date has been
communicated for its entry in the market. The idea is to allow the
consumer to load a certain amount in his or her metre – using the
same selling points that are already in use for mobile
telecommunication.18 This new system would be promoted for18 Load for mobile phones can be purchased in a multiplicity of selling points in
the Philippines. It is available in supermarkets and other large retail centres, but it
is also available in the omnipresent neighbourhood stores, sari sari, that cover thedifferent proﬁles of end-users, mostly low-consumers that are
either poor or that own a secondary condominium which has a
low consumption level. In the case of low-income consumers, the
goal is to make them manage their consumption. It has been ar-
gued that lower-income populations struggle to pay an important
sum of money every month, and can better adapt their con-
sumption to their purchasing power if they have access to a pre-
payment system (Botton, 2004). Pre-payment schemes have been
adopted in number of developing cities, with results that have
varied enormously depending on the acceptance of the system by
the population (Tewari and Shah, 2003; Haselip and Potter, 2010).
The success of this new approach in Metro Manila is therefore
difﬁcult to predict, but Meralco envisions that it is a good solution
to reduce its non-technical losses (Interview H).
5.3. Urban electriﬁcation schemes of second generation: the emer-
gence of new partnerships
While Meralco mostly adopts a repressive stance towards the
urban poor, and is reluctant to grant informal settlements access to
electricity, it has recently launched a new kind of electriﬁcation
programme. The former DAEP had targeted the entire metropolitan
area, and had proven to be costly. In 2011 the DU designed a new
scheme and launched the RAISE programme. So far, it is estimated
that it beneﬁtted approximately 1500 households last year (Inter-
view F). After witnessing the increase of pilferage in areas that had
beneﬁtted from the DAEP, the DU wanted to have better guarantees
that the regular electricity connections it provided would be sus-
tainable. Therefore, the key innovation in this programme is the fact
that clusters of metres are now elevated (Elevated Metering Clusters,
EMC) (Pictures 3 and 4). While wall metres were accessible in the
context of DAEP, they are now located on top of a pole, so that the
population cannot reach the metres easily. The results, in terms of
electricity losses, are satisfactory in the eyes of the DU.
Concerning the ﬁnancing of this endeavour, the situation is
more complex than in the case of DAEP, since no source of funding(footnote continued)
entire metropolitan area.
Picture 3. An elevated metering cluster. Source: Meralco, "Delivering electricity to
vulnerable communities", Asian Development Bank Asia Clean Energy Forum, June
19th 2009.
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fore the cost of RAISE projects is usually divided between various
stakeholders, and the amount that each actor is responsible for is
the result of a negotiation carried out prior to each project. Typi-
cally, LGUs will partly subsidise the cost for elevated metering
clusters, while the beneﬁciary community will help by carrying
materials, installing some of the wires and more generally assist
the DU. Sometimes, Meralco One, the organisation in charge of
social programs in the company – the descendent of the former
Department of Corporate Social Responsibility – ﬁnances the cost of
creating a connection (which involves a governmental fee and a
price ﬁxed by Meralco): such projects constitute 90% of its ex-
penses. In some instances, the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) also contributes ﬁnancially. In any case, the
state agency is often involved in the planning of the RAISE pro-
jects. Finally, the cost of the wiring from the metres to the houses
is usually borne by the end-users. It is also notable that in the case
where the households have to pay the wiring to the metres, the
solution is inconsistent with the regulation in place, which states
that:
The distribution utility shall bear the cost of the wire extending
from the metre to the actual premises of the consumer, except
when the consumer requests for the clustering, and in such
case, the consumer shall bear the aforementioned costs.19
These new electriﬁcation programs are the direct result of co-
operation and negotiation between the LGUs and the DU. The
actors that were interviewed insisted upon the role of consensus
between all parties. This is why the projects tend to differ de-
pending on which city is targeted inside of Metro Manila. There is
not one model prevailing for the ﬁnancing of electriﬁcation
programs.Picture 4. An elevated metering cluster. Source: Meralco, "Delivering electricity to
vulnerable communities", Asian Development Bank Asia Clean Energy Forum, June
19th 2009.6. Conclusion and policy recommendations
In this paper, the electricity sector reform has been presented
as being the result of an energy crisis on the one hand, and a will
to apply the key principles of neoliberalism on the second hand. As
a consequence, the legislation focused on two national objectives:
power prices and security of supply. Public debate regarding the
evaluation of the EPIRA is still very heated in the Philippines, and
fuelled by the recurrent rises in power prices, and investigations
regarding possible collusion between actors of the electricity in-
dustry (Interview I). But beyond these national issues, the reform
has had a more local impact, which becomes apparent when one
looks at its consequences on the urban poor of Metro Manila.
The interaction between administrative decentralisation and
the sector's liberalisation has had important consequences for
energy policies. The central State being focused only on questions
of security of supply and price-setting, LGUs and other urban ac-
tors had to step up and become a true interlocutor to Meralco. And
through city governments, urban poor organisations can more
easily express their concerns and wishes: this evolution of energy
governance stresses the need for “local development” through
popular participation and empowerment. Henri Coing (2002) in-
sists on the idea that regulation is not all about the relationship
between the regulator and the regulated: providing electricity
requires that users be consulted and integrated into the discus-
sions. In the case of urban poor communities, this point is critical:
inhabitants who are refused access to the service tend to tap il-
legally into the network, thus disturbing the network and inducing
costly efforts of repression on the part of the DU (Wang et al.,19 ERC Magna Carta, Resolution No. 25 of 2010, article 11.2010). In this context, the trend initiated by Meralco may be
generalised, to the beneﬁt of the urban poor, but also of the DU
itself. It is very much in line with the ideas that have prevailed in
development theory and practice since the 1990s, and can be seen
as another side of the neoliberal nature of the electricity reform.
Mohan and Stokke (2000) indeed argue that “new managerialism”
underlines the potential of decentralised action in order to weaken
central ministries, and place the responsibility of service delivery
on local authorities' shoulders.20 It also translates into a ﬁnancial20 See for instance the World Bank's World Development Report of 1983, which
makes a clear link between administrative decentralisation and market reforms.
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the community itself, and sometimes and NGO involved in the
programme. The other consequence of this devolution carried out
without any transfer of resources is that electriﬁcation programs
are now much fewer.
The urbanisation of energy issues can have very positive im-
pacts on service delivery. However leading a real policy towards
access to electricity for the urban poor would require the state to
give LGUs real tools and resources. A ﬁrst step would be for the
DoE to include the question in its agenda. Indeed, while the gov-
ernment pays attention to rural electriﬁcation, urban areas are left
aside and no efforts are made to have a homogenous policy over
the national, or even metropolitan territory. There is an adminis-
trative layer at the metropolitan level-the Metro Manila Develop-
ment Authority (MMDA) – in charge of policy coordination for the
greater urban area, but its role in the formulation of energy po-
licies is inexistent. Its action towards urban poor communities is
largely a repressive one21 (Ragragio, 2003). As a consequence,
there is no public authority overseeing these issues on the entire
urban area, and successful models of electriﬁcation projects areA
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
21 The MMDA is the entity responsible for the eviction of informal settlements.not generalised. A complimentary action would be to develop in-
centives for the DU to be more engaged in issues of urban elec-
triﬁcation, and add a social dimension to its prerogatives. Such
initiative can be steered by the regulatory agency, and in this re-
gard, creating a “consumers satisfaction index”22 was a ﬁrst step
towards more performance-based regulation. This principle aims
at increasing the company's efﬁciency through the creation of ﬁ-
nancial incentives, and could encourage Meralco to pay a closer
attention to its poorest – but numerically signiﬁcant – end-users.Acknowledgements
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